Abstract -Oll:Splt� the (uercruJ .. 'tl room 011 $ecurity, criticnJ inronuatlun S)1>lem� rCnillin vulnerable 10 cybcr attacks. The problem stems in large pur. trom tbe ('onstant iuullvaHIlU and twolution of attack lCt'bnlque:s. The trend lends Import ance to tbe .:om:el'l or intrusion h�lerance: B critical system must fend off or 111 least limit tbe damage caus�'tI by unknown and/or undetected .. ttucks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networks and the s�icms that ron on them have become csscnlial to the opemtiou of business enterprises. functioning of the global economy, and the defense of lhe lIation. Yet tht'S(: critical information systems remain vulnerable evcn with the lX.'(;cnlly increased focus on security. The problem STems in large part from the conSlam innovatlon and evolution of attack lechniqucs.
The increasing sophistication and incessant morphing. of cyhcr allacks lend importane!.' to the concept of fllin/sian wlemHce: a critical system must lend oil' or at least limit the damages caused by unkno\,m and/or unde1ected attacks.
An un/mmm auack. is an attack based on new vulnerabilities, exploits and/or altack tcchniques lhat arc yet unknown to the pUhlic, An ulI(tel.ecred att ack is a successful attack thai evades intrusion detection mechanisms long enough to cauSC significant losS(.'i;. The two concepts arc related but not identical: while all UIlk!KlWll auack has grea1er oppnrtunities to evade deteclion, an undetected altack could be based on previously known aUack tt'Chniqucs. The (wo combined represents lhe "unknO\\1l
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1-4244-0198-4/06/$20.00 ©20061EEE 493 unknowns" taced by loday's critical infonnation �ierus in cyber warfaf'C, Our response to these fonnidable challenges is Self Cleansing rntrusion Tolerance. or SClT. The underlying assumption is that all :soCtW{!fC is malleable and imrusioll detection cannOi absolutely detect all system breaches, It follows thai a server that has been online and exposed to attacks mUf>1 be rt:»' llmcd compromised. Consequently, an online server muSl be periodically cleansed to reslore it to a knOWIl ck'll l1 statc, regardless of Whether all intrusion is defected 01' 1101. In II ,2,3,5J we prescnted ollr design.'! of SClT-enabled f1rewalls, web servers, and DNS servers. The primary contribulion of this work is the illlrodUClion of incorruptibility guarantees of scn, called scn j'rimitivcs, enforced by simple hardware enhancements strategically placed in a SeIT server cluster.
We point ou1 thai sen does nOl exclude lhe use of intrusion prevention and detection technologies, but rather adds another layer of defense, eXlending the idea of "defense-tn-depth" through periodic system cleansing. The eftcclivcncss of SOT depends on rast scU:'clcan.!.ing cydes. IlllIS restricting would-he atlackers to short lime windows t{) hreach the system before restormian through scll:clcansing. In response, an attacker may larget SCtT itselfin an attempt to dereat this Ia.st line or system defclt'>c.
In this paper we investigale the survivability of sen under unknown and/or undetected allacits. We flrst review SCiT basics in Seclion 2, We present, in Section 3, a �1 of criteria, called sen Primitives., which ensure lhe incorruptibility of system self-cleansing cycles. A generic design framework thlU satisfies said primitives is discussed in Section 4. Ao; all example, we give in SeetiNt 5 tlte details of an incorruptible sen system for use by domain name services (it is an adaptation of our prior selT DNS d{. 'Sign [3] As a specific example, consider the sen DNS cluster shown in Figure 2 . The cluster comprlses three server boxes and advcnisi..'S IWO II' addresses, a primary !la me server address and a sct,;on d ary name lICrver address. AI any point in time only Qne of lhe servers will be operating in om: of lhe following three states: (1) Primal)' DNS, communicating with dients using the primary IF address, (2) Secondary DNS, communicatlng with clients using the secondary IP address, and (3) Offline ror self-cleansing with no public IP address. Part of the rOlalion process is to bring online servers amine. Next, system is rebooted to initiate cleansing procedures in order 10 return servers to a well-defined clean �1a1e. Al a minimum sm:h a state indudcy symem binaries, system configUl"dlion liIes. critical utililies. service binaries (BIND binaries, Apache binaries, elc.). <ll1d service contiguration tiles. Many services may include (part of) application data as welL In SCIT DNS, ils clean state also covers lhe DNS ma.'>Icr file and crypll)graphy keys. For the sen web servers, the clean state covers stalic HTML pages and web scripts.
In many applications. audit functions c,m also be penonned on offline servers.
We notice lhat a simple fonn or server rotation has previously been employed in high-availability system..,:, where backup servers rotate online to ensure uninterrupted service in face Qr primary server failures r41 sen systems share many design challenges with high.availability syStems, Stich as the seamless server mmsilions and sharing of :renter ldemilics (IP and/or hardware addre;;sc,'l). Examples of existing high-availability !>),slCms include DNS servers. NFS servers, authentication services, firewalls, Figure 4 . I n the figure, we use solid lines It) rcprc:'>cnt network links for TCI»/lP mcssage exchanges (such as Ethernet cables) and dasbcd liIlI.'S 10 represent wircs!fibcTS that conduct e!cctromagnetic control signals, As :K'Cn in Figure 4 (ii}, . I'rimilivc 1>3 concerns the bootstrapping and cleansing procedures US\� by sen servers, Once a server is rebQoted, it enters a bo()tSlrdpping pmcL"Ss followed by cleansing rOUlines. A simple way to clliorce Primitive]>3 is that the entire system uscs rearl··only stomgc for system stale. For instancc, all system components and service sotl warc arc stored Gn a CD-ROM. In tItis case, rcbt)Oling and foading the system from the CD-ROM is the entife cleansing process; alicrward the �yslcm is in a k.nown ck-all stule. This solution has potenlial pcrfomlance problems. due to the slowness of optical drives. Also, many services require the prcdcllncd "system state'" io COver (some) data.
A more flexible approach is to bootstrap a server from a read-only device. However the application data and the binaries loot tbe server needs to perfonn its online functions are stored in a write-able storage, called the mot hard drive. When the $Crver enters an online mode, il switches 10 the hard drive as the mot file system, The sell:.. clcltnsing procedure checks the intcgrily of the Toot hard drive and restores it to a clean state if corruptions arc d(:IC\.'lcd. In the self·cleansing mode, all execlitables (the kemcl, utilities, system check tools, ttc,) arc retrieved from Ihe read-only devicc. We notice that before a server goes online, it CUlUlO( he reached hy exposed nodes and all i IS configurations and binaries arc from read�only storage; hence the fulfillment of Primitive 1>3.
Lastly, it is the (never exposed) central controller thm assi gns a role to a newly cleansed server. While receiving directions of its new role from thc controller, the servcr is disconnected from exposed tlodl'S. Following tlte 1l1gori1lml, the central controller alternates between 1wo timers '1'1 and '1'2 so that role rotations alternate betweell PrimaryHCIt'ausing switches and SccondaryHClcansing swilches. The ;;yslCm Starts 496 wilh the configuration (P,S.C), where server SO is the primary (P). S I the secondary (S) and S2 in ck>ansing (C). (Due to space limits, the steps WhL'fcby scrvers enter !heir respct.'tivc: initial roles have beel! omitted in the aoove prescntation,) After the first timeout event ('J'l fires), the primary server SO and the cll'ansing server 52 switch mode, resulting in the config,llmtion (C,S,P). A comple1e cycle of server romtions is given in Figure 5 . l2 is' Pi � ' . ' " ml i :' :�� C\ ---II-(P, s. c, ---. . timer fires /(S,P, C) 1'2\ I n (p,e,S) II( 1'1 (C,P,S) l;lg. 5: A l;ycJC ofSCiT DNS ;\CI'Ver rotations
VI. CONCLUSION
We have
shown Ihal with simple hardware enhanccmenl" Sll"dlcgically placed in a server cluster. II is possible to build intrusion cQmailuncnt mechanisms Ihal cannot be corrupted. We have presented a SOT/HES DNS duster 3.<; an example of our framework. It is our belief that incorruplihle intrusion C{)nlaiumcnt as presented constilutes a new, clTeclivc layer of defense for critical information systems agaiuSt undetected and unknown attacks, Ihe unknown llnknowlli! in computer system security,
